The effectiveness of vehicle security devices and their role in the crime drop by Farrell, G et al.
Explaining and Sustaining the Crime Drop: 
The Effectiveness of Vehicle Security Devices 
Introduction 
The most important criminological phenomena of recent times are the major drops in 
crime experienced in many industrialised countries over the last two decades. 
Between 1995 and 2007 in England and Wales, violent crime fell 49 percent, 
domestic burglary 58 percent, other household theft 48 percent, bicycle theft 20 
percent, and other theft of personal property 47 percent according to the British Crime 
Survey (Hoare, 2009; 21). While the trends have stabilised at the time of writing, 
these are the most major declines in such crimes ever experienced. 
The U K experience parallels that of many, perhaps most, industrialised countries. The 
crime drops occurred first in the United States where serious violent crime including 
homicide fell by 40 percent (LaFree, 1999; Blumstein and Wallman 2000, 2006). 
With variation by country and crime type there were significant declines across the 15 
European countries for which reliable comparison could be made using the 
International Crime Victims Survey (van Dijk et al. 2007, van Dijk, 2006a, 2006b). 
Significant falls in crime have been identified in other countries including Australia, 
Canada, Japan and elsewhere (see e.g. Zimring, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2009; Rosenfeld 
and Messner, forthcoming; Tseloni et al., forthcoming). Amidst the more general falls 
in crime, declines in vehicle theft were particularly pronounced. In the United States, 
both the national police recorded crime data of the Uniform Crime Reports and the 
National Crime Victims Survey data show that from 1991 to 2008 vehicle theft fell 
around 70 percent. Between 1995 and 2008, vehicle-related theft in England and 
Wales fell steadily and by two-thirds (65 percent: Walker et al., 2009; 3). 
The most prominent explanations for the crime drops offered to date are changes in: 
demographics; sentencing and imprisonment practices; the size and practice of 
policing; gun control and concealed weapons laws; teenage pregnancy and abortion; 
lead pollution; crack markets; and economic strength. Yet despite a range of 
imaginative research and innovative analyses, most of these 'early' hypotheses appear 
to have little explanatory value. Some of the explanations that initially appeared the 
strongest contenders offer explanations that appear particular to the US context. These 
were areas where US experiences differed significantly from other countries including 
those in relation to sentencing and imprisonment, policing, gun control, abortion, and 
the crack cocaine market (see Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008; Farrell et al. in press, 
for recent reviews). 
The theoretical orientation of this paper is drawn from the criminologies of everyday 
life. These interpret crime trends in terms of the changing patterns of opportunity. 
Patterns of opportunity are a function of the supply, distribution and movement of 
suitable targets, of guardians who might protect those targets, and of those most likely 
to commit crime. Cohen and Felson use this basic, and apparently rather simple, idea 
to explain the rise in crime in the United States following the Second World War 
(Cohen and Felson 1979). The increased supply of suitable targets for crime (for 
example easily removed cars and electronic goods), the decreased supply of some 
forms of guardianship (for example with increased participation in the labour market 
and hence reduced levels of day-time home occupancy), and the increased availability 
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and movement of likely offenders (for example young men freed from domestic 
chores) created a rapid rise in crime. None of the developments producing the rise in 
crime was undesirable in itself. Increased criminal opportunities were an inadvertent 
by-product of socio-economic progress. The actual increase in crime spawned efforts 
to reduce it. Methods that focused on opportunity reduction included efforts first, to 
reduce the suitability of targets that would otherwise be attractive to likely offenders 
and second, to improve guardianship where the supply of suitable targets was likely to 
be met by a supply of likely offenders. One possible explanation for the widespread 
crime drop is, thus, that improvements in security have reduced opportunity. Just as 
routine activity theory explained the rise in levels of volume crime (notably vehicle 
crime and burglary) after the Second World War in terms of widening crime 
opportunities, so too perhaps the recent falls in those crimes can be explained in terms 
of shrinking crime opportunities effected by increases in security. 
What we refer to as the 'security hypothesis' has been mooted by Clarke and Newman 
(2006) and van Dijk (2006b). Building on this, Farrell et al. (2008, forthcoming) 
proposed that change in the quality and quantity of security was a key driver of the 
crime drop by reducing the opportunities for it. Their work sought to explain trends in 
England and Wales, and in Australia and focused on vehicle theft and the role of 
security. In keeping with the work of Brown and Thomas, 2003; Brown, 2004; Webb, 
2005; Laycock, 2004) relating to England and Wales, and that of Potter and Thomas 
(2001) and Kriven and Ziersch (2007) relating to Australia, the study concluded that 
better and more widespread vehicle security underpinned the crime drops. 
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The present study complements that of Farrell et al. (2008, forthcoming). It attempts 
more precisely to identify the effects of different security devices and their 
combination. That is, it explores in greater detail the relative effectiveness of different 
car security devices. Furthering the understanding of the contributions from different 
devices rather from them as a whole, is a means of drilling down into the details of the 
causes of the most significant drops in car theft ever experienced. By looking in detail 
at whether the form of opportunity reduction promised by a particular security device 
is matched by detailed patterns of crime, greater confidence can be had that the device 
itself is responsible for the reduced risk of crime: different security devices work in 
different ways to reduce opportunities for different forms of crime, as will become 
clearer as the paper unfolds. Moreover, from a rather practical viewpoint identifying 
the most effective single and/or in-combination car security measures may direct the 
industry towards additional 'crime-proofing' of products and consumers towards more 
informed decisions. In addition to the substantive contribution of this work a simple 
methodology is proposed here to measure the effectiveness of car security devices 
relative to the absence of security, presented as the Security Protection Factor (SPF). 
This can be transferred to other evaluation contexts. The next section gives a brief 
overview of the history of vehicle security to provide a context for the analysis that 
follows. 
Vehicle security 
Vehicle security is almost as old as the automobile itself. Newman (2004) provides a 
fascinating account of the parallel evolution of car security and car safety. Many 
seemingly everyday features such as keys and license plates arose as early responses 
to theft. Keys were an early immobiliser as they isolated the ignition system. License 
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plates reduced anonymity and allowed one stolen black Ford to be distinguished from 
the next. Following the rapid rise in car ownership and theft in the 1950s and 60s, 
mechanical immobilisers (steering wheel and gear locks) showed some potential to 
reduce crime (Mayhew et al, 1976; Mayhew, 1992; Webb, 1994). However, many 
mechanical immobilisers could be overcome: One test found many could be overcome 
in seconds, and half of them in three minutes and 20 seconds (BBC, 2000). Electronic 
immobilisers have evolved as the preferred response. Good quality electronic 
immobilisers tend to be build-in rather than retro-fitted and work by disconnecting 
one or more of the fuel, starter and ignition system (see Tilley et al., 2009). Likewise, 
door locks have evolved in form and placement. Individual windowsill-top push-
button door knobs have been displaced by more discretely located central-deadlocking 
with remote or proximity-activation by increasingly encrypted RFID devices. Systems 
relating to cars are now better regulated: The Vehicles (Crime) Act 2001 introduced 
the registration of motor salvage dealers and number plate suppliers and the Vehicle 
Identity Check scheme, all aimed at targeting the re-selling of stolen vehicles.1 
Licence-plate systems are becoming more sophisticated to reduce false registration of 
stolen vehicles (Webb et al. 2004). Southall and Ekblom (1985) dreamed of the crime-
free car a quarter of a century ago, and it seems that many of the measures they 
recommended have become routinely incorporated during manufacturing. In addition, 
although the present focus is devices fitted in vehicles, environmental influences upon 
car crime have also proved amenable to prevention efforts. Work and leisure routines 
make car parks key nodes but risks can be reduced by quality surveillance, access 
control and other measures (Poyner, 1992; Webb et al. 1992; Clarke and Mayhew, 
1998; Mayhew and Braun, 2004; see http://www.saferparking.com/). Car crime at 
residential nodes can be reduced by better layout that facilitates surveillance by 
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owners, particularly parking on driveways and in garages (see e.g. Clarke and Harris, 
1992). 
Market imperfections mean little information on risk and protection was previously 
available to consumers, so there was little incentive for manufacturers to develop 
security. Hence car theft indices were developed to 'name and shame' manufacturers 
and alert customers to the most stolen makes and models, those in the U K (Houghton, 
1992; Laycock, 2004) following those in the US (Hazelbaker, 1997). Likewise, 
detailed information derived from security tests by Thatcham (the Motor Insurance 
Repair Research Centre) are now publicly available, and information from sources 
such as Motoring Which are increasingly valuable (see Pease and Shaw, 
forthcoming). Over time, built-in and automated security has gradually changed the 
default from insecure to secure among many new vehicles. Time-delayed auto-locking 
means the forgetfulness or apathy of car owners is now less likely to generate easy 
criminal opportunities. This means, as one colleague used to put it, that the careless 
are not necessarily the earless. At the same time, remaining thieves are faced with an 
increasingly difficult task requiring extra time, skills and know-how, tools and other 
resources, and risk. 
Data 
This study employs the British Crime Survey (BCS) data which was retrieved from 
the U K Data Archive at the University of Essex. The BCS is a nationally 
representative survey of adults 16 years or older living in private accommodation in 
England and Wales (Boiling et al. 2008). It has been conducted since 1982, and 
annually with continuous sampling since 2001. Data from the six contiguous annual 
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surveys to 2007 are grouped together here to increase the number of responses 
relating to the many combinations of security devices. Data from both the Crime 
Prevention and Witness Intimidation Module C, and from the Victim Module of the 
survey are used. In Module C, a randomly selected sub-sample (one fourth) is asked 
about the security measures relating to the main household car. Based on these 
answers we estimate the prevalence of car security devices in the population of cars 
which is also referred to herein as the fleet. In the Victim Module, victims of car 
crime are asked about the security measures relating to their victimised car, the 
prevalence of which we then compared to that of the fleet to generate our initial 
outcome measure. We note at the outset that, in the BCS, the classification of 
'attempt' does not distinguish between attempted theft of car and attempted theft from 
car due to the ambiguity of determining the aim of the offender. 
The methodological limitations warrant acknowledged. First, only those security 
features recorded in the BCS can be examined. Second, the sample of main household 
cars on which security information is collected is unlikely to be perfectly 
representative of the population from which victimised cars are drawn because 41.2% 
of households (in our merged 2001 to 2007 BCS file) had more than one car. We 
anticipate this may over-estimate security effectiveness slightly but would have little 
effect on the between-device differences which are our main focus. Third, the car 
security devices of the most vulnerable one percent of the population are unknown. 
This is because detailed information is only collected on the first three crimes per 
victim, and so it is missing for about 1 percent of the sample who experienced more 
than three. The BCS survey strategy for victim module completion prioritises personal 
over property victimisations. This means that when a respondent reports more than six 
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cases of crime (six being the maximum allowed), that the car crimes are more likely 
to be excluded (Boiling et al. 2008). Hence in our merged file, 9.8% of thefts of car, 
7.3% of theft from cars, and 5.2% of attempts lacked information on security devices. 
The following analysis employs the data without weights. The incident weight adjusts 
the sample-based crime rates to represent the population in England and Wales. In this 
analysis however we do not have an estimate of the security features in the population 
of cars (see second limitation above) and therefore it would have been pointless to 
adjust the number of victimised cars. 
The BCS requested information on six main types of car security. These were central 
locking, electronic immobilisers, car alarms, tracking devices, mechanical 
immobilisers, and window security etching. Information on whether devices were 
built-in or retro-fitted was not requested in the BCS except for cars bought in the last 
five years. Likewise, information on the technical specifics of individual devices was 
not available. It also seems reasonable to expect that the quality of new devices has 
improved over time (particularly electronic immobilisers) and have become more 
likely to be built-in rather than retro-fitted. However, these issues are not addressed in 
the present study but could perhaps form part of future research. Such information 
might be available or inferred from data on manufacturing or parts-sales, but 
identifying and collating such information was outside the scope of the present study. 
Each of the six types of security device examined could be used alone or in 
combination with others, giving 64 possible configurations (including 'no security').4 
However, preliminary analysis suggested window etching conferred little additional 
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security and so it was not examined further, a finding that squares with that of Tilley 
et al. (2009). The omission of window etching reduced the possible configurations to 
32. In reality, some combinations were more popular than others. Cars with electronic 
immobilisers always had one or other form of security. There were few cars with 
tracking devices. These patterns probably reflect the more recent implementation of 
such devices into the manufacturing stages of cars that already had other devices 
(alarms and/or central locking). There were 31 configurations in the survey responses. 
However, there were 13 categories which we categorised as minor because they each 
had only a small number of cases (always less than 50) and accounted for only 150 
cases in total. Findings relating to the remaining 18 categories accounted for 22,616 
cases, or 99.3 percent of the total, and are reported here. 
Analysis 
The prevalence of security in the vehicle fleet relative to that for victimised cars 
constituted the initial outcome measure. In essence, the fleet measures the expected 
level of security which, ceteris paribus, would be found among stolen cars. This can 
be compared to the observed level of security among victimised cars. The proportions 
of each were used to derive odds ratios. The odds ratio for each security combination 
could then be compared to that for 'no security' to develop a score for the degree of 
protection conferred. 
Table 1 shows counts of the number of survey responses for the 18 most popular 
security configurations. A particular type of security is denoted by its capital first 
letter, so that A is Alarms, C is Central Locking, E is Electronic immobiliser, M is 
Mechanical immobiliser, and T is a Tracking device. Multiple capital letters denote a 
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configuration of multiple devices, so that CE denotes cars with both central-locking 
and an electronic immobiliser. The first numeric column of Table 1 relates to the fleet. 
Hence in the top left numeric cell, there were 249 households where the main car had 
the four security types constituting ACET. The second numeric column shows the 
number of stolen cars with that security configuration. So, in the top row there were 
only three stolen cars which had the ACET security configuration. The third and 
fourth columns show the number of incidents relating to theft from cars and attempted 
theft. 
For each security configuration, comparing the proportion of cars victimised relative 
to the proportion of cars in the fleet, produces an odds ratio. Hence 3 of 1364 stolen 
cars had ACET compared to 249 of 22616 for the total population of cars which had 
this security combination. The odds ratio is calculated as (3/1364) / (249/22616) = 
0.2. The set of odds ratios are shown in the last three columns of Table 1 for each 
crime type and security configuration. The odds ratios were complemented by a p-test 
for difference in proportions. While the odds ratio shows the difference in the 
proportions, the p-test says whether or not the difference was statistically significant, 
and the three levels of significance indicate to what extent. The bulk of the findings 
did show a statistically significant difference between security levels in victimised 
cars and the fleet. 
INSERT TABLES 1 A N D 2 ABOUT HERE 
The security protection factor (SPF) shown in the first three columns of Table 2 is 
derived from the odds ratios. The odds ratio for each individual security combination 
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was compared to that for 'no security'. Hence the odds ratio of 0.2 for ACET was a 
multiple of 25.4 that of 5.08 for 'no security, that is, 5.08/0.2 = 25.4, our highest SPF. 
Tables 1 and 2 are ranked by the SPF for theft of car. Independent SPFs could not be 
calculated for tracking devices, reflecting their rarity plus the fact that when they were 
used it was always in combination with another type of security device. 
In the final three columns of Table 2, a net interaction effect (NIE) is shown. This is 
the difference between the expected and observed SPFs for security combinations. 
The expected SPF is the sum of the independent SPFs of security devices when used 
alone. For example, the independent SPFs for theft of car, at the bottom left of Table 2 
are: A = 1.2, C=2.7, M=2.8, and E=4.0. Hence the expected car theft SPF for the A E 
configuration is the sum of 1.2 for A plus 4.0 for E, a total of 5.2. This is compared to 
the observed SPF of 5.6 for A E for theft of car, which is greater by 0.4. Hence 0.4 is 
its net interaction effect. The net interaction effect gauges whether the effect of 
combining security devices is the same, less, or more, than the sum of the independent 
effects of those devices. For the two security configurations involving tracking 
devices where an independent SPF was not available (ACET and ACEMT), the NIE 
is based on the other devices in the configuration as this seems preferable to excluding 
those configurations. 
Results 
Different security devices would be expected to impact differentially by crime type. 
Immobilizers would be expected to reduce risk of theft of cars because they make 
them more difficult to drive away, with electronic devices being more effective than 
mechanical ones. However, immobilisers would not be expected to generate much 
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additional prevention against theft from cars because they do not make it more 
difficult to break-in. In contrast, alarms would be expected mainly to reduce theft 
from cars, although they might also deter some of the more opportunistic thieves. 
Central dead-locks (central locking) would be expected to reduce the risk of both theft 
of and theft from cars because they make the car more difficult to enter. The results 
tend to support these broad expectations. 
For theft of car, central locking and electronic immobilisers featured in each of the top 
four security configurations and in, respectively, seven and six of the top seven 
configurations. There were no configurations involving both central locking and 
electronic immobilisers that ranked lower than seventh. Alarms, central locking and 
either or both immobilisers feature in the three security combinations with the highest 
significant SPFs. For theft from cars, alarms and central locking featured in each of 
the six top security configurations and in no other configurations. Alarms and central 
locking also featured in the top five security configurations for attempted car theft. 
Figure 1 presents the SPFs from Table 2 and facilitates easy visual identification of 
the findings that (1) crime prevention generally increases with the number of security 
devices, (2) impact upon theft of car is greatest, (3) impact upon attempts are 
generally least, and (4) the increase in protection is exponential in relation to theft of 
car. It also shows that in the one instance where the SPF for theft from cars is greater, 
it relates to alarms. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Single security devices offered some protection but have relatively low SPFs. Alarms 
on their own confer 20 percent greater protection (SPF = 0.2) against theft of car and 
50 percent greater protection against theft from car relative to no security. The use of 
only central locking (C) or only a mechanical immobiliser (M) approximately doubles 
protection from theft of cars. The individual measure which on its own confers 
quadruple the level of protection against car theft is an electronic immobiliser (E), but 
an electronic immobiliser's effects against theft from cars and attempts are, as 
expected, far less marked than those of central locking. 
Pairs of security devices generally produce significantly greater protection and in the 
anticipated direction. Against car theft, pairs of devices are typically between four and 
twelve times better than nothing. Pairs generally confer greater protection against 
theft of cars relative to theft from cars or attempted thefts. This is shown by the net 
interaction effect values where four of the five pairs are positive for theft of car but 
only one for theft from car and none of those for attempts. This measure suggests 
security pairs generally have an effect that is greater than additive against theft of car 
but not for the other crime types. Central locking and electronic immobilisers are the 
most effective pairing against theft of car (CE has SPF = 11.8 and NIE = 5.1). It is 
notable that the added security from most pairs is less than additive for theft from cars 
and attempts (shown by their negative NIEs). 
Security configuration triplets increase the overall level of security offered. Triplets 
are most effective against theft of car where they are always at least eight times better 
than nothing (SPF= 8.4 for AEM), and as much as 25 times greater. Although the 
SPF 25 for ACET and C E M is arguably the headline finding, it should be treated with 
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caution because the odds ratio for C E M was not statistically significant and there is 
some uncertainty over the SPF for ACET due to the inclusion of the tracking device. 
However, A C E and A C E M have SPFs of 15 and 19, which appear to be reasonable 
minima for the A C E combination against car theft. These configurations have NIEs 
that indicate bonus security effects, perhaps due to the interaction of the devices, that 
are significantly beyond additive. 
Conclusion 
The major drops in crime that were experienced in the U K and elsewhere from the 
1990s were arguably the most important criminological phenomena of recent times. 
Many types of crime in England and Wales were halved. Car theft fell by two-thirds 
and a range of studies suggests this is attributable to more and better vehicle security. 
The present study sought to add to this body of work by teasing out the relative 
contribution of individual security devices and combinations of devices. Central 
locking plus electronic immobilisers, particularly when used in combination and with 
an alarm, tend to confer greatest security. Cars with such devices are far less likely to 
be stolen. Overall, the study lends additional weight to the 'security hypothesis' 
explanation of the crime drops because it provides more specific details on particular 
security devices and their effectiveness. Based on this, the study suggests there is a 
need to explore the security hypothesis in relation to other crime types. Burglary may 
be the next logical step, though it is likely that identification of the causes of the drop 
in burglary may be less straightforward than those relating to car theft. 
13 
The present study suggests additional avenues for future research on vehicle theft. 
There is a need to isolate any possible confounding effects, particularly any due to 
vehicle age and vehicle 'lifestyle' (such as its usual parking location). Vehicle age is 
likely to be positively correlated with the quality and quantity of security, that is, 
newer vehicles will tend to have more and better devices. The inclusion of vehicle age 
in the questionnaire for the BCS car security module would facilitate this analysis. 
The study also has implications for the analysis of combinations of crime prevention 
tactics more generally. Combinations of tactics are often used against household and 
commercial crime. However, their individual and interaction effects are rarely 
distinguished. The possibility of teasing out such interaction effects is an enticing one 
that warrants further research. 
The findings lend support to efforts to build-in security at the point of manufacture. 
They suggest that new cars, as many already are, should be built with a minimal 
security configuration of central-deadlocking, an electronic immobiliser, and an alarm 
system. Each system should meet minimum standards, as they are already required to 
do in the EU, Australia and many other countries. If viewed as an evaluation, the 
present study indicates there are positive crime prevention outcomes from policy 
measures that promote designing-out crime. Hence the findings offer a lesson for 
policy-makers and champions of industry in manufacturing and business with 
criminogenic products and services. Government should seek to nudge manufacturers 
and business towards security as the default position. Frequently stolen electronic 
devices such as MP3s, smartphones, PDAs, laptops, SatNavs could all probably be 
built so that they could be deactivated or tracked if stolen, so that theft is no longer an 
attractive option. Residential and commercial buildings and urban transport and road 
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systems should be designed in ways that overtly seek to minimise criminal 
opportunities. The preponderance of theory and evidence suggests that encouraging 
corporate social responsibility via designing-out crime externalities could be a fruitful 
role for government. 
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Table 1: Sample Sizes and Odds Ratios by Crime Type and Security 
Security 
configuration 
A C E T 
C E M 
A C E M 
A C E 
A C M 
CE 
A C E M T 
A E M 
E M 
A E 
C M 
A C 
E 
A M 
M 
C 
A 
No Security 
Total 
Other 
Don't Know 
Population 
249 
1151 
3363 
5923 
1087 
2074 
168 
164 
302 
182 
874 
1955 
400 
145 
723 
2086 
240 
1530 
22616 
150 
19 
Number of Respondents 
Theft of 
3 
14 
54 
119 
26 
54 
5 
6 
12 
10 
50 
120 
31 
12 
80 
239 
60 
469 
1364 
5 
5 
Theft from 
28 
335 
438 
797 
126 
541 
23 
41 
133 
57 
250 
369 
173 
47 
287 
782 
117 
1133 
5677 
38 
8 
Attempts 
16 
109 
241 
405 
81 
219 
11 
44 
56 
54 
100 
179 
79 
28 
180 
266 
68 
450 
2586 
16 
0 
Theft of 
0.20* 
0.20 
0.27* 
0.33* 
0.40* 
0.43 
0.49 
0.61* 
0.66* 
0.91* 
0.95 
1.02v 
1.29* 
1.37v 
1.83* 
1.90 
4.15* 
5.08* 
Odds ratio 
Theft 
from 
0.45* 
1.16v 
0.52* 
0.54* 
0.46* 
1.04 
0.55* 
1.00 
1.75* 
1.25 
1.14* 
0.75* 
1.72* 
1.29 
1.58* 
1.49* 
1.94* 
2.95* 
Attempts 
0.56v 
0.83* 
0.63* 
0.60* 
0.65* 
0.92 
0.57* 
2.35* 
1.62* 
2.59* 
1.00 
0.80* 
1.73* 
1.69* 
2.18* 
1.12* 
2.48* 
2.57* 
Key: A = Alarm; C = Central Locking; E = Electronic Immobiliser; M = Mechanical Immobiliser; T = 
Tracking Device. 
Notes: 
(1) 'Other' = 13 minor security configurations (see text for explanation). 
(2) Symbols refer to statistically significant difference in proportions (p-test): 
*p-value<0.01; y0.0Kp-value< 0.05; *0.05< p-value < 0.10. 
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Table 2: Security Protection Factor and Net Interaction Effect 
Security Protection Factor Net Interaction Effect 
Security 
configuration 
ACET 
C E M 
A C E M 
A C E 
A C M 
CE 
A C E M T 
A E M 
E M 
A E 
C M 
AC 
E 
A M 
M 
C 
A 
No Security 
Key: A = Alarm: 
Theft of 
25.2 
19.1 
15.3 
12.8 
11.8 
10.3 
8.4 
7.7 
5.6 
5.4 
5.0 
4.0 
3.7 
2.8 
2.7 
1.2 
1.0 
Theft 
from 
6.6 
2.5 
5.7 
5.5 
6.4 
2.8 
5.4 
3.0 
1.7 
2.4 
2.6 
3.9 
1.7 
2.3 
1.9 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
; C = Central Locking; 
Mechanical Immobiliser; T 
Notes: Results are based on 
= Tracking 
Attempts 
4.6 
3.1 
4.1 
4.3 
3.9 
2.8 
4.5 
1.1 
1.6 
1.0 
2.6 
3.2 
1.5 
1.5 
1.2 
2.3 
1.0 
1.0 
Theft of 
17.6 
15.8 
8.5 
7.4 
6.1 
5.1 
-0.3 
0.4 
1.0 
0.4 
-0.1 
1.1 
-
-0.3 
-
-
-
n/a 
Theft 
from 
1.4 
-3.0 
-1.4 
0.3 
1.0 
-0.8 
-1.7 
-2.1 
-1.9 
-0.9 
-1.3 
0.4 
-
-1.1 
-
-
-
n/a 
, E = Electronic Immobiliser; M = 
; Device 
the odds ratios of Table 1 and so 
significance levels still apply. 
n/a = not applicable. 
that table's 
Attempts 
-0.3 
-1.9 
-1.9 
-0.5 
-0.6 
-1.0 
-1.5 
-2.6 
-1.1 
-1.5 
-0.9 
-0.1 
-
-0.7 
-
-
-
n/a 
statistical 
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Figure 1: Security Protection Factor 
Notes 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/vehicle-crime/ 
2
 http://www.thatcham.org 
3
 For example, i f main cars had as much as 10 percent more effective security than non-main cars, then 
our measure of security effectiveness would be an over-estimate by around 4 percent (slightly more 
because 6 percent of households own three or more cars according to the 2001 census findings at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/housing.asp accessed 25 November 
2009). But we anticipate that between-devices differences in security effectiveness would remain only 
marginally affected i f at all. 
4
 Six types of device with two possibilities (present or not) = 26 = 64. 
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